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Abstract

cation of specialization techniques by a broader range of
research and commercial operating system developers.
Our specialization toolkit addresses three difficulties
with existing specialization techniques. First, manual specialization requires the hand coding of each special case.
Our toolkit eases the task of building specialized systems
by automatically generating specialized code and “guarding” the specialized code to ensure it is only executed
when appropriate. Second, manual specialization often
introduces global interdependencies when taking infrequently relevant code outside of the critical path. Our
guarding tools make composing specialized modules feasible by isolating these global interdependencies. Third,
manual specialization creates as many copies of the code
as the number of special cases, making software maintenance expensive and error prone. Our tools ease the task of
maintaining optimized operating system code by preserving the original source and managing the special cases for
the programmer.
We have applied the specialization toolkit to a broad
range of production systems software, including Linux
signal delivery, the Vmalloc memory allocator and Sun’s
remote procedure call (RPC), yielding performance gains
from 10% up to 1200%. These experiences and the resulting performance improvements demonstrate that toolassisted specialization is an approach that improves operating system performance and at the same time, preserves
system code maintainability and safety.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 summarizes the major approaches to specialization and adaptive operating systems. Section 3 describes a
specialization toolkit we have been developing at [institutions omitted for blind reviewing]. Section 4 presents our
experiences with using the toolkit to specialize three areas
of system code: signal delivery, memory allocation, and
RPC. We describe the process of specializing each sys-

Specialization has been recognized as a powerful technique for optimizing operating systems. However, specialization has not been broadly applied beyond the research
community because the current techniques, based on manual specialization, are time-consuming and error-prone.
This paper describes a specialization toolkit that should
help broaden the applicability of specializing operating
systems by assisting in the automatic generation of specialized code, and guarding the specialized code to ensure
the specialized system continues to be correct. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the toolkit by describing experiences we have had applying it in real, production environments. We report on our experiences with applying
the tools to three disparate portions of operating systems:
signal delivery, memory allocation and RPC. We describe
how we used the toolkit to specialize these components,
and present the resulting performance improvements. We
conclude that a toolkit-based approach to specialization
can work, and is an effective operating system optimization technique.

1

Introduction

Specialization has been demonstrated to improve the performance of “generic” operating system code by dynamically creating optimized code for common cases that are
discovered at run time [20, 26]. However promising, specialization has yet to make a significant impact outside the
research community. This paper introduces a toolkit we
are constructing that eases the task of specializing production operating system code. The toolkit enables the appli This research is partially supported by DARPA grant N0001494-1-0845 and DARPA contract F19628-95-C-0193, NSF grant CCR9224375, and grants from the Hewlett-Packard Company and Tektronix.
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tem component, then the measurements of performance
improvements due to specialization. Section 6 discusses
the strengths and weaknesses of the current toolkit based
on our experiences. Finally, Section 7 describes ongoing
work on the specialization toolkit and summarizes our results.

2

Even though specialization can be a powerful optimization
technique, it has not been broadly applied in commercial
operating systems. We believe this is because correct and
effective specialization is hard to do. We have identified a
number of causes for this:

 Deciding what to specialize. It is non-trivial to find
opportunities for specialization. A variable may be
modified in only one kernel procedure (thus suggesting candidacy for quasi-invariant status), but this procedure may be executed very frequently. Conversely,
a variable may be modified by many procedures, but
if those procedures live in “back roads” of the operating system, the variable could still be a good candidate quasi-invariant.

Customizing Operating Systems

Operating system specialization is a promising approach
to improving application performance by adapting operating system behavior to individual application needs. This
section is structured as follows. Section 2.1 describes the
specialization-based approach to achieving operating system adaptivity. Section 2.2 describes the motivation for
the tools, and describes the specialization subtask that each
tool addresses. Finally, Section 2.3 describes how our
tool-based specialization approach relates to other adaptive systems research.

2.1

Motivation for a Specialization Toolkit

 Generating specialized code. The approach that has
been used to specialize operating systems to-date is
to manually generate specialized versions of procedures and write code that dynamically dispatches execution to these when deemed appropriate. This approach is problematic for three reasons. First, it is difficult to manually write code that fully exploits the invariance of a set of quasi-invariants. Logically, this
task should be done by a compiler. Second, manually identifying the conditions for dispatching to a
specialized routine can be tedious and error-prone.
Third, identifying all the associated guards with respect to a quasi-invariant is difficult and error-prone,
and missing any one of them would introduce a bug
into the system.

Quasi-invariants and Specialization

Invariants are the building blocks for constructing specialized systems. We distinguish between two types of system
invariants. A true invariant, like a classical invariant, is a
state property of the system that is guaranteed to be true
at all times. A quasi-invariant is a state property that is
likely to remain true, but may become false at some future
time. Either kind of invariant is stated as an expression using system variables that must evaluate to “true” to facilitate automatic exploitation of the invariant via specialization.
Given that some set of invariants and quasi-invariants
are true, a specialized component can be created that improves functionality or performance over the generic component that it replaces. Optimizations can be done using formal, mechanical methods such as partial evaluation
with respect to the invariants [8], or they can be at a higher
level of changing the component’s behavior while preserving the functional interface, such as changing the page replacement algorithm to adapt to application needs.
Previous specialization research has extensively explored filesystem operations, such as read [20, 26]. In
these projects, various quasi-invariants related to kernel
“open file” objects (file descriptors) were exploited as
specialization opportunities. For example, when an application repeatedly performs small sequential reads, the
file descriptor’s current physical block number is a quasiinvariant. This quasi-invariant was used to generate a specialized version of read that performed better than the
unspecialized read by more than a factor of 3 [26].

 Maintaining specialized code. Current specialized systems are harder to maintain than their nonspecialized counterparts. This is because parallel versions of code must be maintained: the generic version, and each of its specializations. Each modification to the generic version must be manually verified
for its impact (or lack of impact) on each of the specialized versions. Furthermore, the system is complicated by the addition of code that dispatches between the generic and specialized versions of each
specialized kernel procedure. Finally, changing the
quasi-invariants also modifies the guards, which may
be spread all over the system.
In order to build a toolkit that addresses these problems,
we have decomposed the task of specializing an operating
system into three components. (1) Discovering opportunities for specialization, (2) generating specialized code, and
(3) ensuring correctness in the presence of specialization.
We elaborate on these components in turn.
First, one of the most challenging aspects of specializing operating systems is discovering quasi-invariants that
2

provide opportunities for effective specialization. One indication of the difficulty of this task is that all of the previous work in operating system specialization has concentrated on only one subsystem (the filesystem), and only a
limited number of quasi-invariants within that subsystem
(e.g., shared status, sequentiality of reads, and existence
of holes in file layout.) [26]. The experiences reported in
Section 4 indicate that tools can not replace human intuition and experience, but that tools can be used to assist
kernel developers to evaluate quasi-invariant candidates,
and aid the verification phase.
Second, after a set of quasi-invariants have been identified, the next task is to partially evaluate the system, by
effectively recompiling the appropriate routines with the
new assumption that what was previously assumed to be
variable is now quasi-invariant. Previous specialization
experiments involved manual partial evaluation of kernel
routines with quasi-invariants. Our toolkit includes a tool
that automatically generates specialized code by partially
evaluating code that refers to quasi-invariants, thus greatly
reducing the burden on developers.
Third, since specialized code assumes the invariance of
quasi-invariant expressions, if a system condition causes
an invariant to no longer hold, the corresponding specialized code will produce incorrect results. A correct specialized system must detect quasi-invariant violations, and dynamically recover from them. We refer to the detection of
violated quasi-invariants as “guarding.” When a guard indicates that a quasi-invariant has been violated, recovery
consists of removing the specialized routine, and “replugging” a less specialized routine that does not assume the
invariance of the violated quasi-invariant.
Previous specialization experiments required that programmers manually identify all of the locations within the
kernel that may violate quasi-invariants and insert the appropriate guards. Further, once a quasi-invariant has been
violated, developers had to manually recover by replugging. We have developed a tool that automatically identifies most of the sites where quasi-invariants may be violated and inserts guards at those locations. To catch the
cases our tool may miss (because of C’s lack of typesafety), we have developed another tool to dynamically
verify the invariance of a specialized quasi-invariant.

In contrast, systems like SPIN enforce protection
through the use of a type-safe programming language
combined with a dispatcher which enforces constraints
described by the service-writer [24]. For example, the
dispatcher might enforce that a particular virtual memory
extension can only handle faults for the process that
installed it. SPIN also includes a hierarchical name-space
that limits the damage caused by broken specialized
modules to only those tasks that specifically ask to use the
specialized components. The responsibility of ensuring
that specializations do not conflict with each other is left
to to extension-writers and the authors of built-in services.
Exokernel [12] represents another approach to operating system customization. Exokernel pushes system services outside the kernel. Exokernel also enforces mainly
syntactic protection without explicit description and representation of quasi-invariants. Consequently, the responsibility of ensuring that code fragments outside the kernel
will not interfere with each other is left to the authors of
the user-level system services and the developers of subsequent customizations.
The Utah Flux project has constructed a software architecture that supports flexible replacement of operating system components, particularly nesting of operating system
components [13, 14] using concepts such as recursive virtual machines [27]. These flexible layers of indirection
come at some cost. However, specialization may be able
to minimize these costs. The replaceable software components are large and complex, and the relationship between
them is largely quasi-invariant, because the components
are not replaced frequently. As we will show in Section 4,
quasi-invariant relationships between entities in an operating system can be specialized to improve performance.
To summarize our relation to other work in this area,
the tools described in this paper build upon previous specialization projects and could be used in conjunction with
extensible kernels, such as SPIN, and user-level service
based systems, such as Exokernel. In these systems the
toolkit would be used to make the assumptions and interdependencies of system extensions explicit, and automatically generate and guard specialized code modules.

3
2.3

Other Approaches to Customization

A Toolkit for OS Specialization

This section describes a toolkit we are developing that provides the assistance programmers need in order to make
specialization a usable optimization technique. We begin
by reviewing the specialization process, noting where the
tools are to be applied. This is followed by a detailed description of each tool.
To aid discussion, we present here a sample quasiinvariant that was used to specialize Linux signal delivery,
as described in Section 4.1. The following quasi-invariant

Customizing operating systems is an active area of research. The toolkit approach to specialization distinguishes our work from previous specialization work [26],
as well as other customizable operating system projects
such as SPIN [3]. The guarding tools we provide support the explicit description and representation of quasiinvariants, thus helping the system preserve correctness
despite evolving customization and specialization.
3

to assist in placing guards to ensure the applicability
of specialized code. In our example, the kernel developer would have to find all places in the kernel that
change the UID of a process, and guard them to ensure that they do not break some specialized code.

asserts that the process sending a signal has the same UID
as the target process, and thus has permission to signal the
target:
current->uid == p->uid

The variables current and p are of type Replacing Specialized Code Specialized code that destruct task struct *, where current is
pends on quasi-invariants must be re-specialized
the executing process, and p is the target process. The
when the quasi-invariants change. However, the speabove expression is a quasi-invariant, and the data stored
cialized code may be in use when the quasi-invariant
in current->uid and p->uid are quasi-invariant
changes. Therefore, some form of concurrency conterms.
trol must be applied to the quasi-invariants and the
specialized code. Section 3.5 describes our tools for
Postulating Quasi-Invariants As described in Secefficiently allowing concurrent execution nd replacetion 1, discovering appropriate conditions to use as
ment of specialized code.
quasi-invariants is difficult. The general approach is
to use the kernel developer’s intuition to postulate
The remainder of this section describes each of our
that some condition is both quasi-invariant (doesn’t tools.
change rapidly) and useful (the condition is tested
frequently). To answer these questions, the system
3.1 Tempo: Generating Specialized Code
developer must know all the places in the system
where the terms of the quasi-invariant are read and Tempo is a program specializer based on partial evaluawritten. The guarding tools described in sections 3.3 tion [7, 18]. Tempo takes a generic source program Pgen
and 3.2 automate the process of locating these written in C plus a known subset of its input (the quasicomponents, and can assist in determining how fre- invariants), and produces a specialized C program Pspec,
quently a quasi-invariant changes. In our example, which is simplified with respect to the quasi-invariants.
the kernel developer would have to determine how Tempo supports both compile-time and run-time program
frequently the task struct.uid field changes specialization [8], but in the specialization experiments
by first locating all the places in the kernel that write carried out so far, we have used only compile-time specialto the task struct.uid field, and then profiling ization.
the kernel to determine how frequently they occur.
Conceptually, program specialization using partial evaluation is straightforward. Tempo uses the known subset of
Using Quasi-Invariants to Generate Specialized Code
input to analyze Pgen, dividing it into static and dynamic
Given some invariant conditions, specialized code
parts. Immediately, the static part of Pgen is evaluated and
can be generated for certain system components.
reduced using the quasi-invariants (the known subset of
While this can and has been done by hand, it
input), while the dynamic part is copied to the output. The
can be automated using partial evaluation techresult Pspec is usually simpler than Pgen since the static
niques [7, 29]. Partial evaluation is specifically the
part has been pre-computed and only the dynamic part will
idea of defining some of the input to a function to be
be executed at run-time. Informally, partial evaluation can
constant (truly invariant) and using that invariance to
be described as an automated propagation of values known
optimize the code. Section 3.1 describes our partial
to be constant at run-time (typically after some initializaevaluation compiler for C code. In our example, the
tion code).
partial evaluation compiler can remove the tests on
Partitioning program components into static and dythe uid field from the signal delivery code.
namic parts turned out to be insufficient for C programs
Guarding Quasi-Invariants The distinguishing trait of in operating systems. To address the complications in opquasi-invariants is that they aren’t really invariant. erating systems code, several refinements were introduced
Specialized code that depends on quasi-invariants not in Tempo:
changing will break when the invariants do change.
 Static & dynamic variables: those with value known
To ensure correctness, the kernel developer must loat specialization time, so they can be exploited in specate all the places in the system that can cause quasicialization and some code are reduced; but nevertheinvariants to change, and guard them with code that
less some other code is forced to appear in Pspec, e.g.,
will re-specialize the specialized components to redue to values of pointers that are difficult to guard.
flect the new state of the quasi-invariants. The tools
described in sections 3.3 and 3.2, while useful for
 Partially-static structures: data structures that conpostulatingquasi-invariants, were primarily designed
tain some fields with known values, and other fields
4

that are dynamic.

because there are many instances of the task struct
struct. However, we can at least use type checking to lo Pointers to partially static structures: For pointers cate all of the accesses to structs of type task struct.
to partially-static data structures, Tempo must disThis method of locating updates to pertinent types is
tinguish the static subcomponents from the dynamic only as effective as the type-safety of the kernel source
ones.
program. However, we can warn the programmer of typeTempo was used in all of the experiments reported in unsafe operations that may prevent effective location of all
statements that need to be guarded. Such operations inSection 4 to generate specialized code.
clude:

3.2

 type-casted assignment from or to the type of struct
with which we are concerned

TypeGuard: Dynamically Guarding
Quasi-invariants

 attempting to guard a field that is part of a union

TypeGuard is a tool for locating statements in the source
code of a program that write to quasi-invariant terms using
static type analysis. If the quasi-invariant is a staticallyallocated (i.e., global) variable, then guarding the assumption that this property does not change is simple. We can
easily locate all program statements that assign to the variable’s static name.
Unfortunately, most of the state properties in an operating system that are likely to be quasi-invariant are
fields in heap allocated structures. For example, the quasiinvariant current->uid == p->uid refers to two
specific instances of task struct, but there may be
hundreds of task struct structs in a running kernel.
Finding and guarding all places in the kernel that change
state properties on which specialized components depend
is the guarding problem.
We solve the guarding problem using a combination of
static and dynamic methods. Static type checking can locate all kernel source program statements that refer to the
struct type and field name that we are concerned with. A
guard is then placed at each such write. Guards do the runtime checking to decide if the struct being modified is an
instance of the struct that needs to be guarded, and invoke
re-specialization if necessary.
Section 3.2.1 describes our tool to locate updates to
variables that require guarding as indicated by type information. Subsection 3.2.2 describes our guards: an
efficient run-time method for distinguishing among updates to instances of structures of the guarded type: only
those instances pertaining to specialized code require respecialization when they are updated. Subsection 3.2.3
describes our prototype implementation of TypeGuard; a
tool for placing the guards described here.

 taking the address of a scalar field that must be
guarded
To explain the last item, consider that the uid field is
an integer. If a program statement does the following:
int * foo = &(current->uid);
Then foo constitutes a capability to violate our quasiinvariant expression. However, we cannot guard all operations using foo, because its type is far too generic (most
of the system contains int * types) and its value may be
anonymously passed to other parts of the system. Thus we
resort to simply flagging the statement that takes the address of our quasi-invariant term current->uid.
3.2.2

Guards: Re-Specialize If Necessary

The method described in Section 3.2.1 suffices to locate
all assignments to state variables of the type that appear
in our quasi-invariant expression, but cannot distinguish
among different instances of that type. Our specialization
concerns only two processes described by two particular
task struct structures, yet there are often hundreds of
instances of task struct structures in the running kernel.
Whether a quasi-invariant is true of a particular
task struct structure is a dynamic property, and
so we resort to run-time testing of the quasi-invariant
expression to determine whether the update has violated
the quasi-invariant. However, it is only a violation of the
quasi-invariant if the structure was in fact the one referred
to by the expression; the other instances are irrelevant.
Furthermore, the quasi-invariant expression may involve
several structs, and so testing the expression requires
3.2.1 Where to Place Guards
identifying the appropriate instances.
Consider the quasi-invariant
We address these problems by annotating all structs
that
contain quasi-invariant terms with a special QUasicurrent->uid == p->uid
invariant IDentifier pointer field (QUID). In the case that
The quasi-invariant expression refers to the uid field of the task struct struct is the instance referred to in the
an task struct structure. Guarding all writes to the quasi-invariant expression, the QUID field points to an obuid field of the task struct structure is problematic, ject that encodes the quasi-invariant expression in such a
5

way that it can perform a guarded write to the struct. For of guard code requires some optimization, such as only
example, consider this update to current->uid:
checking the quasi-invariant only once after a batch of adjacent updates to quasi-invariant terms.
current->uid = bar;
A guarded update of the current->uid would be written as:

3.3

if (current.QUID != NULL)
current.QUID->write_uid(bar);
else
current->uid = bar;

The guard locating technique described in Section 3.2 is
effective in most cases. However, it is critically dependent on the type-safety of the of the kernel source code and
the compiler. Our specialization techniques are aimed at
real legacy operating systems, thus we need another guardplacement technique to locate kernel statements that may
escape TypeGuard’s notice through one of C’s many type
checking holes.
The MemGuard tool is a library of functions that use
virtual memory page protection to locate additional kernel
operations that require guarding. The basic notion is to set
the virtual memory page protection bits of a page containing a quasi-invariant term to read-only, in order to trap attempts to change the quasi-invariant value and report them
as errors. Writes to other values on the same page that are
not recorded as quasi-invariant terms are simply written by
the MemGuard trap handler without generating a trap.
Clearly the performance penalty for writing to a page
via a trap handler is too high for MemGuard to participate
in a performance-oriented system, and that is not MemGuard’s purpose. Rather, MemGuard is provided as a debugging and development tool for the specialization kernel programmer. The kernel programmer enables MemGuard’s protection capabilities, runs the system through
a test suite, and then examines the log of quasi-invariant
violations produced by MemGuard. The kernel programmer then inserts guards at the locations indicated by MemGuard, and iterates the process until the kernel passes the
test suite without complaint from MemGuard.
Figure 1 shows the API provided by the MemGuard library. Section 3.3.1 describes some of the implementation
details of MemGuard. Section 3.4.1 describes usage of the
MemGuard library.

The update uid function writes the current->uid
field in any case, but also atomically adjusts any specialized components that depend on quasi-invariant expressions that depend on this task struct.uid value.
This guarding code has the property that it very quickly
identifies struct instances that are not specialized, and
dispenses with further checking. However, if the struct
does contain quasi-invariant terms, it efficiently locates
the code necessary to evaluate the continued validity of
the quasi-invariant and invokes the checking code. The
guarding code is sufficiently simple that it can be packaged
inside a macro, so that the kernel programmer hardly need
know it’s there:
GW_uid(current, bar);
3.2.3

Runtime Guarding Through Virtual
Memory Protection

TypeGuard Prototype

We have constructed a tool called TypeGuard that does the
type-checking described above. The tool is based on the
SUIF compiler toolkit [36]. SUIF provides a basic framework that parses C source code and stores it in a standardized intermediate format that is used by each phase of the
compiler. We have used the SUIF library of functions for
manipulating this intermediate representation to process
the program as follows:
1. Locate all declared variables of the type we are concerned with and build a list of their names.
2. Locate all writes to variables of those names.

3. Eliminate assignments to fields that we are not con- 3.3.1 MemGuard Implementation
cerned with.
When MemGuard is asked to guard a quasi-invariant term,
4. Report the remaining statements as locations in the the first task is to turn off write-permissions for that page
in virtual memory. In some architecture/OS combinations,
program that need to be guarded.
such as the HP-UX operating system on the HP-PA archiTypeGuard currently only emits a list of locations in tecture [6], we were able to locate protection bits in the
the program that need to be guarded; it does not yet auto- virtual memory hardware that were not used by the opermatically generate the guarding code. Future development ating system. However, this is not always possible, and
of TypeGuard will include a guard generator that actually so MemGuard must allocate a page descriptor for each
inserts the guard code rather than just indicating where page containing quasi-invariant terms; the page descriptor
the guard code should be inserted. Automatic insertion records whether that page was writable or not apart from
of guard code is relatively simple, but efficient insertion the protection imposed by MemGuard.
6

Enable()/Disable() Enable and disable the MemGuard facility. This is useful to focus debugging on
a particular section of the kernel.

Operation
Normal write
MemGuard write

Min
0
1624

Avg.
2
1971

Max
1.9
2434

Protect(addr, size) Make the data at virtual address addr of size size a quasi-invariant term, i.e. Table 1: Overhead of MemGuard Writes, in machine cycomplain if it is written to.
cles
Release(addr) Remove MemGuard protection from
the quasi-invariant term at virtual address addr.

3.4

Write(addr, size) Write a new value into the
quasi-invariant term at address addr of size size.
It is an error if size does not match the size of
the quasi-invariant term when it was originally protected. Write is used to perform the guarded writes
required by TypeGuard. Write changes the quasiinvariant term’s value without complaining.

MemGuard Performance

The time in cycles required for MemGuard to perform various operations is compared to the time for a normal write
is presented in Table 1. These measurements were performed on a 100 MHz Pentium PC. The actual overhead
of running an operating system with MemGuard active depends on the particular terms being guarded and the workload being measured. However, this overhead should only
be incurred by kernel developers during guard-placement
trials.

Figure 1: The MemGuard API

3.4.1

Using MemGuard

Once the page is protected, all writes to that page will
trap to the MemGuard trap handler. Only a small fraction of the writes will be to quasi-invariant terms, the others will be to various kernel data structures that happen
to share the page.1 Thus the page descriptor must also
contain a list of the quasi-invariant terms on the page so
that writes to the page can be differentiated between writes
to quasi-invariant terms (which log error messages) and
writes to neighboring kernel data structures (which proceed normally).

As mentioned above, MemGuard is intended to act primarily as a debugging tool to the specialization kernel
programmer. The kernel programmer finds undetected
updates to quasi-invariant terms by exercising the kernel
with a test suite and using MemGuard to detect the writes
to quasi-invariant terms. The thoroughness of the guard
coverage is a function of the degree to which the test suite
exercises the kernel. Access to the OS vendor’s test suite
enhances MemGuard’s utility.

The cost of writing to non-protected data structures
residing on protected pages is, in part, determined by
how quickly the MemGuard trap handler can distinguish
between quasi-invariant terms and the neighboring data
structures: much of MemGuard’s overhead results from
this kind of false sharing.

3.5

Replugger: Dynamic Re-Specialization

When a quasi-invariant expression is violated, then the
system must adapt itself to the new circumstance without
relying on the quasi-invariant. When a guard detects that a
quasi-invariant has been violated, it invokes a specialized
version-management component, described in [10]. The
most common action to be taken by the version-manager
is to replace the dependent specialized components with
other, differently specialized components, or with generic
components. This replacement is called replugging, and
requires fast, safe, concurrent dynamic linking.
The challenge is to facilitate very low latency execution of a function via an indirect function pointer while
concurrently allowing the pointer to be changed. Locks
are a logical choice, but locks may substantially degrade
performance. In [9], we describe a portable algorithm
that supports low-latency invocation of replaceable functions while allowing concurrent update of pointers to those
functions.
The need for sophisticated replugging is a function of
the kernel and the hardware. Table 2 shows the kinds of

Some regions of memory, such as the kernel’s statically
allocated data structures, are sufficiently dense that the
page descriptors can be laid out in a linear array indexed by
the address of the faulting page. This approach is not practical in general, because a 32-bit address space with 8 KB
pages results in 524,288 pages. 64-bit machines, such as
the HP-PA [6] and the DEC Alpha [30] further aggravate
this problem. Thus MemGuard must resort either to hierarchical data structures [28], or explicitly allocated and
managed memory regions [31] that are sub-indexed linearly.
1 Unfortunately, it is not possible to move a quasi-invariant term to a
separate page without inducing consistency checking problems at least
as difficult as the guarding problem itself.
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Kernel
Single-threaded
Multi-threaded

sults and our tool-assisted specialization of the same systems. Unfortunately, this was not possible for a number of reasons. First, our specialization tools require the
system code to be written in ANSI C, but the subject of
the previous specialization experiments, HP/UX, is written in K & R C. This was a major factor in our choice of
the Linux system for evaluating the toolkit. Second, we
could have repeated the hand-specialization experiments
on Linux, and compared them to the same specializations
done via the toolkit. Unfortunately, the portions of the system that were addressed in previous experiments have already been hand-specialized in the Linux system. Comments from the developers who did this specialization [17]
bear out our claim that doing such specialization by hand
is difficult and obfuscates the system.
The rest of this section describe our experiences with
using the tools to specialize three disparate system components: kernel signal delivery, RPC and memory allocation.

Hardware
Uniprocessor Multiprocessor
function
simple
pointer
replugger
simple
counting
replugger
replugger

Table 2: Replugging Needs as a Function of Kernel and
Processor Architectures

replugging systems needed for various combinations. The
definition of the terms is as follows:
uniprocessor, multiprocessor One CPU vs. multiple
CPU’s in a shared-memory multiprocessor.
single-threaded, multi-threaded : Whether or not more
than one thread from a single process can be concurrently executing a system call, an important distinction when system calls can block inside the kernel.

4.1

Signal Delivery

A common source for specialization opportunities comes
from transient “connections” between entities in the system. These connections can be explicit, as when a process
opens a file to build a connection between the process and
the file, or they can be implicit, as when a group of processes repeatedly communicate to achieve some common
goal. In any case, the transient connection between entities produces quasi-invariants describing the relationship
between the entities.
In previous file system specialization experiments [20,
26], the connection was between a process and a file, and
the quasi-invariants related to things such as the location
of the file, and whether the file was shared. In this experiment, the connection is between two processes A and B ,
where A is repeatedly sending UNIX signals to B . We
treat the target and destination processes and their relevant properties as quasi-invariant, and specialize the signal delivery mechanism accordingly, using the Tempo partial evaluation compiler augmented with some human assistance.

function pointer No replugging techniques required,
since the kernel is a giant mutex over the whole
machine. Thus a function pointer suffices, without
additional concurrency control requirements.
simple replugger An asymmetric concurrency control
mechanism, as described in [9]. This concurrency
control mechanism allows fast invocation of the replaceable function, and somewhat slower replacement of the function.
counting replugger An enhancement to the simple replugger that counts the number of threads executing
the specialized code. Making such a counting replugger concurrent-safe requires an atomic increment of
some kind.

The experiments described in [26] were performed using HP-UX 9.04 (which is single-threaded) on an HP9000
S800 dual processor, and thus we implemented the simple replugger. The experiments described in section 4
of this paper were performed using Linux 2.0 on various
single-processor Pentium PCs, and thus only simple func- 4.1.1 Specializing Signal Delivery
tion pointers were used.
Figure 2 shows the structure of the kill system
call. Each of the functions sys kill, kill proc,
send sig, and generate do some error checking and
4 Experiments
interpretation on the signal and whether the sender has
This section presents the results of some experiments that the right to send it to the target. In addition, kill proc
evaluate the effectiveness of our specialization toolkit in searches the process table for the process with the specified pid. The source code for these functions is shown
broad areas of operating system specialization.
We would have preferred to be able to perform a di- in Figure 3.
rect comparison between previous hand-specialized reSpecialization proceeded in two steps. The first was
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sys_kill(int pid, int sig)

asmlinkage int sys_kill (int pid, int sig)
{
int err, retval = 0, count = 0;

pid, sig

if (!pid)
return (kill_pg (current->pgrp, sig, 0));
if (pid == -1) {
struct task_struct *p;
for_each_task (p) {
if (p->pid > 1 && p != current) {
++count;
if ((err = send_sig (sig, p, 0)) != -EPERM)
retval = err;
}
}
return (count ? retval : -ESRCH);
}
if (pid < 0)
return (kill_pg (-pid, sig, 0));
/* Normal kill */
return (kill_proc (pid, sig, 0));

kill_proc(int pid, int sig)
task_struct *, sig
send_sig(int sig, task_struct * p)
task_struct *, sig
generate(int sig, task_struct * p)
}

Figure 2: Linux kill System Call Architecture

int kill_proc (int pid, int sig, int priv)
{
struct task_struct *p;
if (sig < 0 || sig > 32)
return -EINVAL;
for_each_task (p) {
if (p && p->pid == pid) {
return send_sig (sig, p, priv);
}
}
return (-ESRCH);

to introduce a caching mechanism that would record the
previous target process and signal, and re-use this pointer
if a new kill system call is invoked with the same
target pid and sig values. The caching mechanism
consisted of a task struct * last sig to field
in the task struct structure, and an if statement in
kill proc right ahead of the search of the process table.
The caching mechanism was introduced by hand.
While partial evaluation is a powerful technique, it cannot
invent data structures and algorithms. In principle, the
process table search could be partially evaluated with
respect to the pid being searched for. Unfortunately,
the current state of partial evaluation technology would
require constructing a static process table to search, which
is a long and difficult process. The caching mechanism
took about 10 minutes to write.
The second step was partial evaluation of the code.
The generic kill source code shown in Figure 3 from
kill proc onward was compiled by Tempo, along with
the specification that the following values and fields are
static:

}
int send_sig (unsigned long sig, struct task_struct *p, int priv)
{
if (!p || sig > 32)
return -EINVAL;
if (!priv && ((sig != SIGCONT) || (current->session != p->session)) &&
(current->euid ˆ p->euid) && (current->euid ˆ p->uid) &&
(current->uid ˆ p->euid) && (current->uid ˆ p->uid) &&
!suser ())
return -EPERM;
if (!sig)
return 0;
/* Forget it if the process is already zombie’d. */
if (!p->sig)
return 0;
if ((sig == SIGKILL) || (sig == SIGCONT)) {
if (p->state == TASK_STOPPED)
wake_up_process (p);
p->exit_code = 0;
p->signal &= ˜((1 << (SIGSTOP - 1)) | (1 << (SIGTSTP - 1)) |
(1 << (SIGTTIN - 1)) | (1 << (SIGTTOU - 1)));
}
if (sig == SIGSTOP || sig == SIGTSTP || sig == SIGTTIN || sig == SIGTTOU)
p->signal &= ˜(1 << (SIGCONT - 1));
/* Actually generate the signal */
generate (sig, p);
return 0;
}
static inline void generate (unsigned long sig, struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned long mask = 1 << (sig - 1);
struct sigaction *sa = sig + p->sig->action - 1;
/* Optimize away the signal, if it’s a signal that can
* be handled immediately (ie non-blocked and untraced)
* and that is ignored (either explicitly or by default) */
if (!(mask & p->blocked) && !(p->flags & PF_PTRACED)) {
/* don’t bother with ignored signals (but SIGCHLD is special) */
if (sa->sa_handler == SIG_IGN && sig != SIGCHLD)
return;
/* some signals are ignored by default.. (but SIGCONT already did its
deed) */
if ((sa->sa_handler == SIG_DFL) &&
(sig == SIGCONT || sig == SIGCHLD || sig == SIGWINCH || sig == SIGURG))
return;
}
p->signal |= mask;
if (p->state == TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE && (p->signal & ˜p->blocked))
wake_up_process (p);

 the sig and pid parameters
 the current pointer, which points to the currently
executing process
 the last sig and last sig to cache fields in the
task struct structure
 the
task struct.pid,
task struct.session, task struct.euid
and
task struct.uid
fields
in
the
task struct structure

}

Figure 3: Linux kill System Call Source Code

The result is a specialized kill proc procedure called
kp usr1, as shown in Figure 4. Tempo has reduced 90
lines in three functions to a single function of 40 lines,
largely by eliminating redundant tests on quasi-invariant
properties such as the euid value of the target and destination processes.

4.1.2

Signal Specialization Performance

The basic performance impact of signal specialization is
shown in Table 3, which compares the latency of sending
SIGUSR1 from a process to itself. Time is reported in 9

int kp_usr1 ()
{
struct task_struct *p;

Kernel
Standard
Specialized

{
int suif_tmp12send_sig_2_1;
int suif_tmp11send_sig_2_1;
suif_tmp11send_sig_2_1 = 0;
suif_tmp12send_sig_2_1 = suif_tmp11send_sig_2_1;
if (suif_tmp12send_sig_2_1) {
send_sig_SSSDDDStr_sigaction_DDDSSSS_flat2 = -1;
goto pprocfin0;
}
if (((*(*current).last_sig_to).sig != (void *) 0) == 0) {
send_sig_SSSDDDStr_sigaction_DDDSSSS_flat2 = 0;
goto pprocfin0;
}
{
struct sigaction *sa;
unsigned int *suif_tmp2;

Latency (-seconds)
29.5
2.0

Table 4: Signal 0 Latency (no handler invocation):
Speedup Due to Specialization
Kernel
Standard
Specialized

sa = (struct sigaction *) ((char *)
(*(*(*current).last_sig_to).sig).action + 160) - 1;
suif_tmp2 = &(*(*current).last_sig_to).signal;
*suif_tmp2 = *suif_tmp2 | 512;
if ((*(*current).last_sig_to).state == 1 &&
((*(*current).last_sig_to).signal &
˜(*(*current).last_sig_to).blocked) != 0u)
wake_up_process ((*current).last_sig_to);

Latency (-seconds)
16.7
13.8

Table 5: Single User Mode Signal Latency: Speedup Due
to Specialization

}
send_sig_SSSDDDStr_sigaction_DDDSSSS_flat2 = 0;
pprocfin0: ;
}
return send_sig_SSSDDDStr_sigaction_DDDSSSS_flat2;

The work in the kill system call consists of searching
the process table, and interpreting the state of the parameters and the processes to detect errors and special cases.
Figure 4: Specialized kill System Call Source Code: To minimize the time spent searching the process table,
kill proc, send sig, and generate Folded and and to minimize other noise from these experiments, we
Specialized
re-ran these experiments in single-user mode, as shown in
Table 5. The size of the process table clearly has a major
impact on the cost of the kill system call, but specialization has still improved performance by 1.21, or 21%.
Kernel
Latency (-seconds)
}

Standard
Specialized

44.1
15.3

4.2

Table 3: Signal Latency: Speedup Due to Specialization

seconds, averaged over four executions of a program that
does 100,000 signals. The cost of signalling is a function
of the number of processes in the system: in this case, one
user was logged in, running an X11 server and three xterm
programs and associated shells, and a few other X11 applications running, for a total of 62 processes. Under these
(arguably typical) conditions, specialization improved the
total latency of signal delivery by 2.87, or 187%.
Total signal latency is composed of several factors, and
we did additional experiments to separate those factors
out. All of our specialization occurred in the kill system
call implementation, and did not affect the scheduler, or
the signal handler invocation mechanism. Sending a signal of 0 has the semantics of not invoking any signal handler at all, and so we measured the total latency of sending a signal of 0 to isolate the impact on the kill system
call, as shown in Table 4. Specialization has improved the
speed of the kill system call by 14.75, or 1,375%. A system call that used to involve approximately 30 -seconds
of work has been reduced to the null system call.

Application-level Impact

Finally, one might wonder what kind of application would
actually care about the performance of repeated signals. Our original intuition was that signals are used between processes to communicate asynchronous information, such as the arrival of a video frame in a buffer [5].
However, this technique is also used to implement more
general services: Xavier Leroy’s POSIX Threads implementation for Linux [19] uses signals extensively for interthread synchronization. Linux threads are somewhat unusual, in that they use kernel level processes with shared
address spaces, rather than threads within a single process,
much like Plan 9 [25] variable-weight processes. Signals
are used to communicate between these processes in the
thread library.
Table 6 shows the impact of signal specialization on a
test program using this thread library. The test program is
an implementation of the classic producer-consumer problem, using thread mutex’s for synchronization. The test
does 100,000 producer-consumer iterations, with a buffer
size of four items. Table 6 shows that not only has signal
specialization improved average performance by 2.11 or
111%, but it has also substantially reduced the variance in
the program run time. Single-user mode tests of this program eliminate the variance in both programs, and yield a
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Kernel
Standard
Specialized

Vmalloc_t* vmopen(Vmdisc_t* disc,
Vmethod_t* meth, int flags);
int vmclose(Vmalloc_t*);
int vmclear(Vmalloc_t*);
int vmcompact(Vmalloc_t* region);
int vmset(Vmalloc_t* region, int flags,
int type);
Void_t* vmalloc(Vmalloc_t* region,
size_t size);
Void_t* vmalign(Vmalloc_t* region,
size_t size, size_t align);
Void_t* vmresize(Vmalloc_t* region, Void_t* addr,
size_t size, int type);
int vmfree(Vmalloc_t* region, Void_t* addr);

Experiment Run time in seconds
1
2
3
4
Avg
8.26 13.82 9.35 16.05 11.87
6.55
5.07 5.78
5.00
5.60

Table 6: Thread Mutex Performance for Four Runs
void
void
void
void

*calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
*malloc(size_t size);
free(void *ptr);
*realloc(void *ptr, size_t size);

Figure 5: ANSI-C Malloc interface

Figure 6: Vmalloc interface

3% benefit for specialization. The small performance gain
under these extreme circumstances is expected, but further ing operations.
study is required to find the source of the variance in perAs the memory allocator has control over where heap
formance in the multi-user mode.
data is placed, it follows that the memory allocator has direct influence on the memory reference pattern generated
by the client program. Poor placement policy can cause
4.3 Memory Allocation
the client to incur more memory penalties than otherwise
Dynamic memory allocation is another example where necessary. Recent work in memory allocation suggests
generalized system facilities fail to capitalize on regular- that specializing allocators to real program behavior is imity present in real program behaviors. The standard malloc perative in addressing all dimensions of allocator perforinterface is shown in Figure 5. While generic and concise, mance [4, 2, 15, 32, 35].
this interface hides from allocator implementations details
that can be used to improve performance.
There are several dimensions to memory allocator per- 4.3.1 Vmalloc: Towards Specialized Allocation
formance: latency, fragmentation, and locality. The need
to dynamically allocate memory is virtually ubiquitous, so Vmalloc is an allocator that extends the standard malthe latency of allocator operations should be minimized. loc interface with the notion of memory regions, each
Programmers are quick to code around the allocator if they of which has an associated discipline for obtaining new
memory and a method for managing it [32]. Figure 6 conperceive latency to be unacceptable.
Fragmentation is a measure of how efficient an allocator tains a portion of the Vmalloc interface. By providing varutilizes of memory. Fragmentation and allocator latency ious different disciplines and methods, Vmalloc allows apnecessarily trade-off against each other. Many studies em- plication programmers an ability to tailor memory allocaphasize that maximizing the allocator’s capacity to avoid tion to their needs.
Many of the specialization strategies proposed for malfragmentation should be the primary design objective [35].
loc
can be mimicked easily with Vmalloc because of the
Latency and fragmentation have traditionally been
flexibility
of its interface. Vmalloc’s general purpose alloidentified as the key performance dimensions for malloc,
cator
is
based
on a best-fit method which combines use of a
while locality effects are often overlooked. There are reasplay
tree
data
structure and several performance improvsons to believe that existing allocators have design traits
ing
heuristics.
Performance
of Vmalloc’s best-fit allocator
that cause them to negatively affect the client program’s
is
competitive
with
the
best
of
several popular malloc imlocality of reference.
plementations
[32].
Internally, allocators commonly employ performance
enhancing heuristics, such as boundary tags, that disregard
Vmalloc provides a transition path to specializing memthe penalty of polluting the data cache [16]. A boundary ory allocation of legacy programs. A set of stubs is protag is a technique that reduces the space overhead of the vided that allows the standard malloc calls to be redirected
allocator by placing bookkeeping data inside currently un- to Vmalloc. Once Vmalloc is in place, the program can be
used memory blocks. This can produce near pathologi- migrated in pieces to make use of Vmalloc’s more specialcal reference patterns when the allocator does bookkeep- ized methods.
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4.3.2

Specializing Opportunities in Vmalloc

of the additional latency that would otherwise accompany
Vmalloc’s flexibility.

Our initial decision to investigate memory allocation
as a specialization candidate was that the size argument to malloc is very often static; calls of the form
malloc(sizeof(...)) are commonplace. Our objective is for Tempo to specialize Vmalloc’s best-fit allocator based on the quasi-invariant resulting from a static
size.
The best-fit allocator contains three distinct strategies
corresponding to tiny, small, and large objects respectively. Small objects are the simplest case. They can be
handled by indexing to one of a fixed number of linked
lists. Tiny objects are handled in a similar way, but require
additional work because bookkeeping data that Vmalloc
normally stores in the free objects will not fit. Large objects use a linked list to implement some caching of recently freed objects, but falls back to a splay tree when
necessary. The splay tree is very effective for dealing with
bad allocation patterns, but nevertheless imposes much
more overhead in cases where a link list would do. Vmalloc employs several heuristics aimed precisely at avoiding
the splay tree. By specializing for static size arguments,
we can remove the initial interpretation and directly execute the appropriate strategy. For the small objects, this
leads to code similar in spirit of the synthesized allocators
produced by CustoMalloc [15].
The region abstraction provided by Vmalloc is yet another example of binding a “connection” between system
entities. This binding allows Vmalloc to provide specialized services, but it imposes the familiar interpretation
overhead and associated indirections through region data
structures. The number of actual regions used by a program would start at one and progress to some relatively
small number.
The region parameter given to each Vmalloc operation
is dynamic, but once determined it is likely invariant for
the lifetime of the program. For our experiment, we concentrate on the core operation of the general purpose allocator, the bestalloc() operation provided by the
best-fit method. We specialize bestalloc() with respect to the default region; that is, the region associated
with the standard malloc stubs. The goal is to convert
all calls to malloc into calls to this specialized version of
bestalloc.
By identifying the region and size parameters as quasiinvariant, we use Tempo remove a great deal of the latency
in the Vmalloc bestalloc operation. We note that, as
with caching introduced in the signal experiment, techniques for improving the other performance dimensions of
memory allocation require higher level algorithmic specializations than partial evaluation provides. Vmalloc provides a framework for addressing the other dimensions,
while the application of Tempo to Vmalloc removes much

4.3.3

Vmalloc Specialization Performance

For our experiment we use a set of benchmark applications
provided by Benjamin Zorn’s memory allocation repository [37]. The benchmarks are run to measure four scenarios.
The first scenario, LIBC, uses standard malloc implementation provided in the Linux libc library. The second,
VMALLOC, uses the unmodified Vmalloc via the malloc compatibility stubs. The remaining scenarios, which
we call SynthoVmalloc1 and SynthoVmalloc2, measure
two alternative approaches to deploying Tempo specialized Vmalloc. The two specialized Vmallocs are distinguished by whether the original programs are recompiled.
In SynthoVmalloc1, we are interested in measuring the
feasibility of linking against a shared library version of
SynthoVmalloc. Invoking a function in a shared library
has overhead, but saves system space. The overhead will
negate some of the advantages gained through specialization but we have still converted multiple interpretations
into one up-front dispatch. This can be thought as a timespace tradeoff where interpretation time has been traded
for cost of replication of code space. If code blowup becomes problematic, this technique might prove useful.
SynthoVmalloc2 aims for maximum specialization.
Client code is recompiled, so that fully static invocations
can make use of inlining.
Note to program committee: a bug
in one of our tools prevents us
from correctly parsing the vmalloc
source code. This bug is unrelated to
performance, and thus will not affect
the results reported elsewhere in
this paper. We are very confident
that we can fix this bug by the
final paper deadline, and expect
performance results similar to our
other experiments.
4.3.4

Further Experiments

We are interested in pursuing the locality dimension of
allocator performance, but we need new profiling tools.
Current profiling tools do not measure locality effects. We
plan to make use of Pentium hardware features which allow measurement of several kinds of cache event. The
same specializations above on size and region will be used
in conjunction with the specialized methods of Vmalloc to
improve locality. For example, we can identify important
common large object sizes and allocate them from using
Vmalloc’s pool method. Aside from decreased memory
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overhead this affords, [4] shows how common initializa- particular, C-Mix is point insensitive, which means that a
tions can be avoided to improve locality.
variable is considered dynamic as soon as it is dynamic in
any part of the program, including exception handling. CMix is also more consumptive of code space, because it
4.4 RPC Specialization
eagerly replicates code to avoid problems in binding-time
The specialization of Sun RPC (proposed in [34]) was analysis.
the first successful application of systems code using partial evaluation, in particular the Tempo program special- 5.2 Lackwit C Program Understanding
izer [8] (summarized in Section 3.1). Since the RPC
Tool
experiment is being reported in another submission to
SOSP’97 (Automatic Specialization of Sun RPC Using a Lackwit [22] is a program understanding tool for C based
Partial Evaluator, by anonymous authors), we only out- on type inference. Lackwit discards C’s type system as
too weak to be useful, and instead infers its own dynamic
line the main results here.
The RPC experiment applied the Tempo program spe- types for values based on the set of operations the value
cializer to post process the client stub code produced by participates in, derived from a conservative data flow analSun rpcgen stub generator. Their main idea is to take ysis of the program. Thus Lackwit can construct rather
advantage of the values declared at RPC initialization time interesting types, e.g. the type of pointers that are allothat remain constant through the execution of subsequent cated and freed, as distinct from the type of pointers that
RPC calls. Examples of these static values include the are allocated but not freed. This kind of analysis could be
choice of underlying protocol (e.g., UDP), plus the num- very useful in placing guards for quasi-invariants in sysber and type of RPC parameters. Tempo takes the static tem code, similar to TypeGuard. Lackwit performs more
parameters, and specializes the client stub, producing per- precise analysis than TypeGuard, but at the expense of usformance gains of between 2 to 3.5 times speedup in RPC ing an algorithm that is NP-hard in the worst case.
microbenchmarks and between 13% and 22% speedup for
an application program using RPC to send and receive in- 5.3 OMOS Dynamic Linking Tool
tegers of an array.
From the specialization toolkit point of view, the RPC The Utah Flex project developed OMOS [23], an
experiment is notable since the Sun RPC is commercial, object/meta-object server that allows the dynamic linking
mature code. Two advantages follow from the application of executable modules. OMOS provides for the dynamic
of Tempo to commercial code. First, by preserving the instantiation of executable modules, and wraps them in an
original source code, Tempo preserves the system main- object-oriented package, even if they were not written in
tainability and safety for the programmer. Second, the suc- an object-oriented language. OMOS provides considercessful use of Tempo to representative commercial system ably more functionality than our replugger, including the
shows the promise of applying Tempo to other industrial ability to specify which module should be loaded using
certain code properties, such as whether it is in memory,
strength operating systems code.
or has been linked to sit at a particular address range.
Thus OMOS encompasses some of the functionality of
our quasi-invariant guards, but does the checking only at
5 Related Specialization Tools
load time.
This section describes some related work developing tools
for specialization. Some of the tools described were actu6 Experiences and Discussion
ally designed for specialization, such as the C-Mix [1] partial evaluation compiler. Others are general-purpose soft- This section summarizes our experiences with tool-based
ware engineering tools that just happen to be useful for specialization, beyond the performance improvements despecialization, such as the Lackwit C analysis tool.
scribed in Section 4, and highlights some ideas for future
research. The discussion ranges from comments on the
status and effectiveness of specific tools to more general
5.1 C-Mix Partial Evaluation Compiler
statements about the fundamental obstacles to the wideC-Mix [1] is the only other partial evaluator for C pro- spread propagation of tool-based specialization.
grams besides Tempo. Like Tempo, C-Mix can partially
evaluate C programs, do inter-procedural analysis, and
6.1 Experiences with Specialization Tools
deal with complex data structures and side-effects. However, it was not specifically designed to deal with systems Not surprisingly, we found out that operating systems C
code, and thus its analysis is not as precise as Tempo’s. In code is not an easy target for partial evaluation tools. We
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discovered that despite Tempo’s state of the art binding
time analysis (BTA), we still had to find work arounds
to help it optimizing certain code paths containing pointers. For example, it does not currently handle assertions
about fields of structs accessed via pointers unless a concrete instance of the struct is provided. Such examples are
common in operating system code. Two approaches seem
promising in addressing this problem.
First, instead of trying to make BTA more sophisticated in handling the obscure situations caused by pointers, frequently we found it more appealing to improve
obscure code. This indicates the desirability of semantically cleaner programming languages, such as Java, ML
or Modula-3, for building specialization-friendly operating systems. In particular, the use of Java for implementing JavaOS has already shown some interesting optimization opportunities, such as copy-elimination [21].
A second solution to the problem of analyzing pointers is to make the various stages of compilation explicit in
the original code. We have begun investigation into how
such staging should be expressed, using an object-oriented
paradigm [10, 33]. Other examples related to this kind of
approach are the use of an explicit eval function in functional programming and the ’C (tick C) approach [11].

6.2

Experiences with Guarding Tools

The correctness and performance of a system containing
specialized code depend on the correctness and performance of the guarding tools. There are interesting correctness and performance trade-offs for each of the guarding
tools proposed in this paper.
MemGuard is guaranteed to catch all write accesses to
guarded locations. However, this degree of correctness
comes at the expense of high overhead for page protection
fault and single-step trap handling. Performance could be
improved somewhat by reducing the number of unnecessary page protection faults due to false sharing by laying
out data such that guarded locations are allocated on their
own private pages, or by employing hardware techniques,
such as Liedtke’s fine-grained page tables. The overhead
of single-step trap handling could also be avoided by simulating the completion of the faulting write instruction, but
at the expense of significantly increased complexity in the
tool.
Instead of guarding accesses to quasi-invariant terms
at run time, TypeGuard attempts to identify all writes to
fields of structs of a certain type at compile-time. However, types that are frequently used but rarely specialized
can impose a more guarding overhead than benefit gained
from specialization. TypeGuard’s coverage is limited by
the type safety of the particular program being analyzed:
arithmetic on variables of type void * make all type
analysis irrelevant. In a type-safe language such as Java,

the TypeGuard approach will be able to catch all such
writes.
Manual specialization is a potential source for introducing bugs into systems. In contrast, tool-based specialization has the potential to ease the software complexity problem pointed out by the industry panel at
OSDI’96. Code that has been hand-specialized for performance tends to be more complex and difficult to maintain,
aggravating the cost of OS development. Generic code,
which is correct but not specialized for various circumstances, is relatively simple and easy to maintain. Automatic program specializers have the potential to transform
such generic code into specialized code, combining most
of the performance of hand-tuned code with the maintainability of generic code.

6.3

Summary and Future Work

Overall, we observed significant leverage in managing the
specialized code. Specialization by hand would have required either multiple versions of the source, or a lot of
conditional compilation. With Tempo, the original code
remained mostly untouched. For instance, once the initial problems of partially evaluating the signal code were
solved, dozens of specialized versions of the kill system
call implementation followed in just a few minutes. We
expect the Tempo-produced specialized code to be much
more amenable to later examination than would be the
case for a hand specialized version.
The tools presented in this paper aid in the production of specialized code paths and in guarding them. Another important problem is how to identify good opportunities for specialization. In all our experiments to date, we
have identified them by hand, using expert knowledge and
heuristics to determine whether they would be good opportunities for specialization.
It would be useful to have tools to identify hot spots
in operating systems, distill quasi-invariants of such hot
spots, and evaluate the feasibility of a given specialization
strategy. There are many difficult specialization policy issues to solve such as whether a particular specialization
is worthwhile given a particular guarding strategy, which
specialized versions to generate ahead of time, which ones
to cache, and what policies to use for managing such a
cache.
Our experience shows the definite usefulness of our first
generation specialization tools. We are in the process of
developing more tools to increase the degree of automation of the specialization process.
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7

Conclusions

Even though specializing operating systems has been
demonstrated to have the potential of significant performance improvements, experience with specialization has
been limited to only a part of the research community.
This paper described a toolkit that should enable specialization to be used by more operating systems developers,
both research and commercial. We have evaluated the effectiveness of the toolkit by using the tools to successfully specialize a broader range of operating system components than has previously been possible. The resulting
components performed significantly better than their unspecialized versions, as we had hoped.
Furthermore, we found that automated specialization
combined with tool-assisted guarding provides the added
benefit of improving the maintainability of optimized
code, by obviating significant changes to the original
source. In this regard, successful experiments with production operating system code demonstrate the potential
value of the toolkit beyond the research community.
Our experience with the toolkit has suggested areas for
further work, particularly the creation of tools that assist
developers identify useful opportunities for specialization.
Based the experiences reported in this paper, we see toolbased specialization emerging as a key development tool
for efficient, adaptive and maintainable operating systems.
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